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Abstract. Memory corruption attacks remain the primary threat for computer security. Information
flow tracking or taint analysis has been proven to be effective against most memory corruption at-
tacks. However, there are two shortcomings with current taint analysis based techniques. First, these
techniques cause application slowdown by about 76% thereby limiting their practicality. Second, these
techniques cannot handle non-control data attacks i.e., attacks that do not overwrite control data such
as return address, but instead overwrite critical application configuration data or user identity data. In
this work, to address these problems, we describe a coarse-grained taint analysis technique that uses
information flow tracking at the level of application data objects. We propagate a one-bit taint over
each application object that is modified by untrusted data thereby reducing the taint management over-
head considerably. We performed extensive experimental evaluation of our approach and show that it
can detect all critical attacks such as buffer overflows, and format string attacks, including non-control
data attacks. Unlike the currently known approaches that can detect such a wide range of attacks, our
approach does not require the source code or any hardware extensions. Run-time performance overhead
evaluation shows that, on an average, our approach causes application slowdown by only 37% which
is an order of magnitude improvement over existing approaches. Finally, since our approach performs
run-time binary instrumentation, it is easier to integrate it with existing applications and systems.
Key words: Information Flow Tracking, Taint Analysis, Buffer Overflows, Format String Attacks,
Non-control Data Attacks
1 Introduction
Memory corruption attacks remain the primary threat for system breakins and security incidents.
Vulnerabilities such as buffer overflows and format string attacks are used heavily to exploit ap-
plications and to allow attackers to gain illegitimate access. According to CERT, 14 out of 20
vulnerabilities with the highest severity metric are memory corruption vulnerabilities [1]. For re-
mote applications, an important security concern is the nature of data that is being sent to the
application from untrusted sources. Such untrusted data can cause damage, such as system break-
ins, if it is not checked properly by the application. Hence, tracking the flow of such information
to detect memory corruption attacks is a mandatory requirement to safeguard critical network ap-
plications. Signature based scanning is often too slow to respond to attacks such as the Microsoft
Windows server service RPC handling remote code execution vulnerability (MS08-067) [2], that was
exploited by the Conficker worm [3]. Such attacks have the tendency to bring down the network
resources within a span of few minutes. Hence, real-time detection of attacks, especially zero-day
exploits, caused by information from untrusted sources is a critical and challenging task.
Several recent works [4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13] demonstrated that information flow tracking, or
taint analysis is an effective technique for detecting a wide range of security attacks that corrupt
control data such as return addresses or function pointers. This technique works by labeling the
input data from untrusted sources as “unsafe” or tainted. The data derived from such tainted
data is marked as tainted as well. An attack is detected when program control branches to a
location specified by the unsafe data e.g., if the tainted data overwrites a function return address.
However, due to the fine-grained nature of these techniques i.e., a taint flag per byte of memory, the
overhead of taint management and processing is high and slows down the application considerably.
Furthermore, the current taint analysis approaches cannot detect non-control data attacks [14].
Consider a case where a buffer is overflowed to overwrite adjacent memory that holds a boolean
flag which indicates whether the user has been authenticated or not. By overflowing the buffer and
overwriting the boolean flag, an attacker can gain illegitimate access without changing any control
data of the application. Since no control data such as return address is overwritten, previous taint
analysis based approaches would not be able to detect such an attack. Such non-control data attacks
have already been studied in the past [14], and past research has shown that the implications of
such attacks are same as those of control data attacks, i.e., complete system compromise. Thus,
current taint analysis suffer from performance overhead and the inability to detect an important
class of attacks aimed at non-control data.
In this work, we describe coarse-grained object level dynamic taint analysis, a low-overhead
information flow tracking technique. Our approach is based on the observation that it is possible
to reduce the overhead of taint analysis by tainting objects i.e., application variables, where each
object that has a specific type and size. By doing so, the semantics of the original taint analysis
remain unaffected i.e., we will be able track the flow of tainted data in the application. An additional
benefit to this coarse-grained approach is that, by knowing the size of the variable we can detect
attacks against non-control data by the tainted objects.
We perform taint analysis on binary executables and hence, do not require the source code. To
extract the objects from the executable, we use the symbol table of the application that is generated
as part of the debugging information for the executable. Once the variables are extracted we store
them along with the executable. Next, we use a user-defined policy to identify untrusted sources
of data. Using this policy, when the application is run, we dynamically instrument the application
with code that tracks and monitors the data from the untrusted sources. An attack is detected if
either the tainted data overwrites control data or if the tainted data tries to overwrite beyond the
boundary of an untainted variable. Our contributions are as follows:
– We present a novel coarse-grained view of taint analysis that preserves the semantics of fine-
grained (byte level) taint analysis and reduces the processing overhead. The low computational
overhead in our approach makes it feasible for using it in real-time applications. Previously
proposed information flow tracking techniques slow down program execution by about 76%
[12,6,10,9]. Our approach reduces this overhead by an order of magnitude, to about 37%, which
indicates that our approach is practical to use in deployed applications.
– Our approach is capable of detecting a wide range of attacks including buffer overflows, format
string attacks, integer overflows and double-free attacks. Also, some of the previously proposed
taint-tracking based techniques do not defend against non-control data attacks [14]. Our ap-
proach can distinguish between different objects, identify their bounds and therefore can defeat
non-control data attacks.
– Unlike some of the previous approaches [12] that are capable of detecting non-control data
attacks, our approach does not require source code of the application. Furthermore, many
approaches proposed in the past require special hardware [4,7,11,13] to propagate taint. Our
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approach does not require any such non-trivial hardware extensions, and works with existing
systems and applications.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes some of the most common
memory corruption attacks. Section 3 presents the technical description of our approach. Section 4
presents the experimental results on the effectiveness and performance evaluation. In Section 5, we
discuss the ramifications of various security threats and issues in our approach. Finally, in Section
6 we conclude the paper with some future work.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce the threats being addressed in our work, the related work in this area
and our problem statement with assumptions.
2.1 Security Threats
Memory corruption vulnerabilities arise when a program uses an unchecked external input. By
providing a kind of input that the programmer did not expect, an attacker may cause the program
to execute malicious code. The most commonly exploited memory corruption vulnerabilities include
buffer overflows and format string bugs. Although, our work addresses integer overflows, heap
overflows and a wide range of overflow based attacks, we do not discuss them. They are similar to
these popular attacks.
Buffer Overflows. In a buffer overflow attack, the attacker’s aim is to gain access to a system
by changing the control flow of a program. Usually, an attacker needs to inject malicious code in
the original program execution path. This code can be inserted in the address space of the program
using any legitimate form of input. To make the program execute this code, the attacker corrupts
a code pointer in the program address space by overflowing a buffer and making it point to the
injected code. When the program later dereferences this code pointer, it jumps to the attacker’s
code. Other complicated forms of buffer overflow attacks attempt to change the program control
flow by corrupting other code pointers such as, function pointers, global offset table (GOT) entries
or longjmp buffers, by overflowing a buffer that may be, locally, globally or dynamically allocated,
respectively. Such buffer overflows occur mainly due to the lack of bounds checking in C library
functions and laxity of the code writer. For example, the use of strcpy() in a program without
ensuring that the destination buffer is at least as large as the source string is a common practice
among many C programmers.
Format String Attacks. Format string vulnerabilities occur when programmers pass user
input directly to a format function, such as printf() or syslog(), i.e., using code constructs such
as printf(str) instead of printf("%s", str). This input is interpreted by the format function
as a format string, and is scanned for the presence of format specifiers such as %x, %s, %n etc.
For each format specifier, corresponding value or address is picked from the stack and is read or
written, depending on the format specifier. To exploit this vulnerability, a common form of the
format string attack uses %n format specifier, which takes an address to an integer as argument,
and writes the number of bytes printed so far to the location specified by the address. Using %n
format specifier, an attacker can overwrite the stored return address on the stack with the address
of his own code, taking control of the program when the function returns. Other targets include
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address of destructor functions in DTORS table, address of library functions in the GOT, function
pointers and other security critical data.
Non-control Data Attacks. Classical memory corruption attacks overwrite control data such
as stored return addresses, function pointers etc. Such a control-data attack are relatively easily to
defend by watching over these control data. However, the same attacks can be made to overwrite
program specific non-control data such as a boolean flag that specifies whether the user is authen-
ticated or not. Many real-world software applications are susceptible to non-control data attacks,
and the severity of the resulting security compromises is equivalent to that of control-data attacks.
2.2 Related Work
There has been much interest in addressing memory corruption vulnerabilities in the system security
community. We classify the related work under three categories.
Memory Corruption Defenses. These defenses are mainly aimed to protect the program
address space from illegal modifications. Approaches such as StackGuard [15], StackShield [16],
ProPolice [17] and LibSafe [18] and TIED-LibSafePlus [19] have been proposed as defenses against
buffer overflows. Other approaches like FormatGuard [20], FormatShield [21], LibFormat [22], Kim-
chi [23], Lisbon [24], White-Listing [25] defend against format string attacks. However, these ap-
proaches are limited to certain types of vulnerabilities or exploits, and many of them even require
source code of the programs to be protected.
Recently, more general techniques based on randomization of address space have been proposed.
The intuition in these approaches is to randomize program address space so that an attacker cannot
easily guess the locations where function pointers or return addresses are stored. This has been
demonstrated effectively in the Address Space Randomization techniques described in [26,27,28,29]
and instruction set randomization in [30,31] However, these attacks are susceptible to brute-forcing
attacks and can be defeated. Moreover, they are more of a preventive measure in that, the actual
buffer overflow vulnerability is only masked by these approaches. A determined attacker can still
break through such techniques. Our approach is orthogonal to these approaches as it is a detection
based approach and considers a wider range of attacks.
Information Flow Tracking Defenses. The purpose of information flow tracking is to mon-
itor malicious data as it is processed by the application. At any point if the malicious data violates
a user defined policy an attack is said to be found. Information tracking using static taint analysis
has been used to find bugs in C programs [32,33,34] and to find potential sensitive data in Scrash
[35]. The interpreted language, Perl [36] does run time taint checking to see whether data from un-
trusted sources are used in security-sensitive ways such as as argument to a system call. However,
the processing overhead is high in Perl and moreover, since it is language based, the applicability is
very limited. The approaches described in [11,7,4,13] perform taint tracing at the hardware level.
These techniques are clearly more expensive and difficult to incorporate into existing systems.
Binary instrumentation for taint-tracking was first used in TaintCheck [6]. However, their ap-
proach slows down programs significantly (by about 37x). TaintTrace [10] achieved significantly
faster taint-tracking by using more efficient instrumentation based on DynamoRIO. LIFT [9] im-
proved the performance benefits further by using better static analysis and faster instrumentation
techniques. Although all of these approaches detect a wide range of memory corruption attacks,
none of them defends against non-control data attacks, rendering them vulnerable to privilege
escalation.
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Non-control Data Attack Defenses. With respect to detecting non-control attacks, the
approach in [12] is the most relevant to our technique compared other taint analysis techniques.
However, the approach in [12] assumes the availability of the application source code, and needs
recompilation of the program that is being protected. Therefore, this approach cannot be effective
if the source code in unavailable, such as in COTS software or in Microsoft Windows applica-
tions. Our approach does not require source code as it uses binary rewriting and dynamic binary
instrumentation to monitor information flow.
2.3 Problem Statement and Assumptions
We address the problem of detecting memory corruption vulnerabilities that may target control
and non-control data. The general problem of thwarting non-control attacks is difficult and requires
application context to solve it completely. We look at a subclass of problems that do require minimal
application context and can prevent a majority of non-control data attacks. In our approach, we
assume that debugging information is present in the executable. This information is used to extract
the variables from the symbol table. Note that, this is not a stringent requirement as most software
has this information to enable maintenance and repair during its life-cycle. We discuss further about
this requirement in section 5. In the next section, we describe our framework in detail.
3 Object Level Dynamic Taint Analysis
This section presents an overview of our approach and the details of the binary instrumentation
framework that is required to implement the taint analysis.
3.1 Approach Overview
Our approach is based on the observation that in a program, variables are the entities used by a
programmer to accomplish any task, such as receiving user input, reading or writing files, arithmetic,
etc. As a program executes, these variables might be copied among themselves (such as a=b), values
of some variables might be derived from other variables (such as c=a+b), others might be received
from user input (such as gets(str)), etc. An attacker may cause the value of one variable to
illegitimately affect the value of another variable or control data by providing a kind of input that
the programmer did not expect, such as an excessively large input, an out of bounds value, an input
with format specifiers, etc.
By tracking the source of each variable, we propagate taint on these variables. We refer to these
variables in memory as objects in our approach. We extract variable addresses and their sizes from
the debugging information. By using binary rewriting, this information is inserted in the program
binary as a new loadable read-only section, available at run time. At run time, we associate a tag
with each object, that can have two values: 0 (“safe”) or 1 (“unsafe” or “tainted”). The program
is then dynamically instrumented to perform information flow tracking and to detect attacks that
alter program control flow to unsafe data. All objects received from untrusted sources, such as
network or command line arguments, are marked as tainted. As the program executes, the taint is
propagated among objects. Any operation that results in an object being written, causes the tag
of the destination object to be affected by that of the source object. Any attempt to branch to an
address specified by a tainted object detects an attack. The overview of our approach is shown in
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Fig. 1. Approach Overview
Figure 1. Henceforth, we will use the term “object” and “variable” inter-changeably unless explicitly
specified.
Tainting Policy. Our tainting policy for objects is simple, if a particular object’s state is
changed directly by a tainted object then we mark the current object as tainted as well. This can
be expressed as follows. If a variable Z is being modified by a function, F that takes one or more
tainted objects as parameters, then, Z becomes tainted as well. The function F can be any function
that directly affects Z. Formally, if Z is affected by F directly i.e., in the same statement then, Z is
tainted if one or more parameters of F are also tainted. Note that, this policy excludes implicit flows
that often occur due to programmer mistakes, e.g., changing a variable based on logical condition
on a tainted value. Moreover, [12] has noted that tracing implicit flows is a hard problem.
Justification. Based on our tainting policy, we argue that our approach captures the semantics
of the previous taint analysis approaches in [9,6,10] and hence, is justified. Earlier approaches
propagate taint on every byte of memory. In our approach, note that, the taint tag is propagated
on all bytes associated with a single variable. This implies that, even if a single byte of this variable
is modified by tainted data, the entire range of bytes associated with the variable become tainted.
In fact, our tainting process is a super-set of the byte-level tainting process in [9,6,10] as an entire
sequence of bytes is tainted even if a single byte is tainted. Furthermore, we propagate taint in
all operations where the tainted variables are accessed thereby ensuring that all data affected by
tainted data is marked tainted as well. Thus, based on these arguments, our approach appropriately
captures the semantics of previous approaches. Later, using experimental evaluation we validate
this justification thoroughly.
3.2 Framework Overview
Our framework consists of the following steps. First, our approach identifies data objects in the
application being checked. We perform static analysis during this phase to determine the instruc-
tions that refer to the data objects at run-time. Second, we describe the taint tag management and
storage issues in detail. Third, we describe the dynamic instrumentation framework that we use to
rewrite the application at run-time. We show the different code instructions that are instrumented
at run-time. Finally, we describe the exploit detection policy and the exploits detected using the
instrumented code.
Identifying Objects. The first step in our approach is to extract the objects from the ex-
ecutable and make it available to our taint tracking framework at run-time. Note that, for each
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executable, this is a one-time process. The extracted information is added to the executable and
stored along with it. Our object extraction uses an enhanced version of the TIED1 [19] framework
which is suitable for our purpose. Since the program is compiled with debugging information, it
contains variables location and size information that can be used at run time. TIED extracts lo-
cation and size information of all the buffers in the program and dumps it in the executable as a
separate loadable read-only section. For global variables, the addresses are known at compile time
itself, while for local variables only offset from the frame pointer is known at compile time. We have
modified TIED so that it dumps the location (virtual address for the global variables and offset from
frame pointer for local variables) and size information of all the variables in the executable. The
members of arrays, structures and unions are also explored to detect the variables that lie in them.
Figure 2 demonstrates a typical case of variables within structures. TIED detects all 40 variables in
this case. This location and size information is loaded at run time to identify objects in the virtual
address space of the program. Figure 3 shows a code fragment and the corresponding objects that
are created at run time. For the example code, the previous approaches would read the input up
to 1024 bytes, mark the tag for all the bytes read as tainted and then propagate the taint to the
destination. However, in our approach we mark the object src as tainted and taint is propagated
to dest object. Therefore, for the same code, our approach marks an entity as tainted only once
and taint propagation is required just once, thus saving taint marking as well as propagation effort
to a large extent.
Static Analysis. We statically analyze the program to identify instructions referring to these
struct s {
char a;
int b;
};
struct s foo [20] ;
Fig. 2. Variables within a structure
variables in memory at program run-time. Global variables are identified by looking at the address
being referred by the instruction. Local variables and function arguments are identified by looking
at the offset from frame pointer. A negative offset identifies a local variable and a positive offset
identifies a function argument.
Tag Management. We associate a one bit tag with each object and register, which can have
only two values (0 for “safe” and 1 for “unsafe”). As a single bit tag is maintained for an object
that may span several bytes, the space overhead is considerably lower than approaches that use
a single-bit tag per byte of memory. Instead of maintaining tags for the entire program’s address
space, we maintain tags only for writable parts of the program. This is done since the non-writable
parts of the address space cannot be affected by the user input and are therefore assumed to be
“safe”. Hence, the tag for any object belonging to a read-only part of the address space is assumed
to be 0 or “untainted”.
We store tags for objects in a separate memory region, called tag space (or shadow memory),
which is addressable via a one-to-one direct mapping between an object and the tag-bit in the
program’s virtual address space. Such a direct mapping makes it straightforward and fast (with
1 Type Information Extractor and Depositor
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void readdata (int fd) {
char dest [1024];
char src [1024];
read (fd , src , sizeof(src ));
strcpy(dest , src);
}
Fig. 3. Objects in a stack frame
only one memory access and a few arithmetic instructions) to get the tag value for a given object.
At program load time, our prototype uses the information dumped by TIED to identify objects in
the process address space. For every object, our approach maintains a (offset, bit) tuple, which
is used to locate its tag bit. The offset refers to the difference between the tag byte that holds
the tag bit for an object and the beginning of the tag space, and the bit holds the bit position
in that byte. This tuple is determined using static analysis of the program during load time. At
program load time, instructions that refer to an object are located, and are instrumented so as to
propagate taint at runtime. For local variables, for which memory is reserved on the stack only
when the corresponding function is called, this step is deferred till the corresponding function is
called.
Dynamic Binary Instrumentation Framework and Tracking. To enable taint tracking,
when the program is executed, we dynamically instrument the code. The instrumentation process
supplements the code with additional instructions to enable object tracking and taint propagation.
The instrumentation needs to be done every time the program is restarted. Our dynamic binary
instrumentation approach is built on top an existing dynamic binary instrumentation framework
called Pin [37]. Pin provides efficient instrumentation by using a just-in-time (JIT) compiler to
insert and optimize code. In addition to some standard techniques for dynamic instrumentation
systems including code caching and trace linking. Pin implements register reallocation, liveliness
analysis, code inlining and instruction scheduling to optimize jitted code.
A tag space of one bit is maintained for each object that was identified during static analysis. At
program initialization, all tags are cleared to zero. Data (objects) received from untrusted sources
such as network or standard input are marked as tainted. As the program executes, other objects
may be tagged as tainted via information flow. A tainted object may become untainted if its value
is reassigned from some untainted object. In accordance to our formal definition of taint policy (cf.
Section 3.1), we instrument all data movement and arithmetic instructions.
– For data movement instructions such as mov, lods, stos, push, pop, etc, the tag value of
the source operand is propagated to that of the destination. For data movement instructions
which move a constant value in an object, we instrument the instruction to mark the object as
untainted at run time.
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– For arithmetic instructions, such as add, sub, xor, etc, the tag value of the destination is the
OR of the tag values of the source operands, since the value of the destination is affected by
both the source operands.
– For instructions which do not involve any second operand (explicit or implicit), such as inc,
dec, etc, the tag value does not change.
movb $0x10 ,% eax
mov $0xfffffffe ,% ecx
rol $0x03 ,% ecx
and %ecx ,$0xa8000000 (% eax)
mov $0x0400 ,%ebx
Fig. 4. Instrumentation for the instruction mov $0x0400,%ebx
In Figure 4, we show the instrumentation code generated for the instruction mov $0x0400,%ebx.
As this instruction is associated with moving data it needs to be instrumented. Since a constant
value 0x0400 is being copied to ebx register, the register needs to be marked as untainted. To
do that, a value (0x10 in this example) is copied to register eax. This value is an offset from the
beginning of the tag space (0xA8000000 in this example). Another value 0xfffffffe is copied to
ecx register. This value is then rotated left by 3 bits to create a mask, which is then ANDed with
the byte at address A800000000 + 0x10 = 0xA800000010, to mark the corresponding taint bit for
the ebx register as untainted. The original instruction is then executed.
Other instructions are identified using the rules described above. Note that, these rules are not
applicable for a few special instructions for which the result is untainted irrespective of whether
the operand is tainted or not. For example, in x86 architecture, the instructions such as “xor
%eax, %eax” or “sub %eax, %eax” clear the eax register irrespective of its previous value. In our
approach, we identify such instructions and mark the corresponding register as untainted. We in-
strument calls to functions that allocate memory such as malloc() to identify corresponding object
in global shadow memory. Calls to functions that copy memory such as memcpy() or strcpy() are
instrumented to propagate taint from the source object to the destination object. Calls to functions
such as memset() are instrumented to mark the corresponding argument as untainted if the source
byte lies in an untainted object. For mmap or mmap2 system calls, we check the return value to see
if the allocation was successful. For each successful allocation, we identify objects in the global
shadow memory. In Table 1, we show a categorized list (partial) of instructions that are identified
for instrumentation.
3.3 Exploit Detection Policy
We use a configurable exploit detection policy to detect any exploitation attempts. The exploit
detection policy specifies the sources that are untrusted, for example, network, files, standard input,
command line arguments, environment variables, etc. Any data object received from an untrusted
source is marked as tainted. The policy also defines the checks that are applied when the program
is run. Based on our exploit detection policy, we instrument all control altering instructions such
as call, jmp, ret, etc. and check the branch address. A branch address belonging to a tainted
object detects a control hijacking attack. To detect format string attacks, we instrument calls to
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Table 1. Instructions instrumented for Taint Tracking
Instruction type / System or library
call
Instrumentation
Data movement instructions, e.g. mov,
lods, stos, etc.
tag[dest] = tag[source]
Arithmetic instructions, e.g. add, sub, xor,
etc.
tag[dest] = tag[a] OR tag[b]
Instructions without any second operand,
e.g. inc, dec, etc.
No change in tag value
Calls that copy memory, e.g. memcpy,
strcpy, etc.
tag[dest] = tag[source]
Calls that set memory, e.g memset tag[dest] = tag[source] if source is not con-
stant, else tag[dest] = 0
functions in the printf, syslog, and warn/err family. A format string belonging to a tainted
object detects a format string attack. The policy also checks whether any non-control objects are
marked as tainted in an illegitimate manner. For example, a stack overflow attack that does not
overwrite the stored return address, but only overwrites the next object on the stack is noted in the
exploit detection policy. Table 3 lists the exploit detection policies that are required for detecting
different types of attacks.
Table 2. Attacks detected by different policies
Policy Attacks Detected
Tainted branch addresses Classical stack smashing attacks, common
buffer overflows and frame faking attacks
Tainted format string arguments Format string attacks
Tainted system call arguments Any kind of code injection attacks
Tainted control data, e.g. tainted bound-
ary tags in heap or longjmp buffers etc.
Heap overflows and stack overflows
Tainted Non-control data, e.g. variable
containing user privileges etc.
All kinds of non-control data attacks
The following discussion illustrates the attacks and the checks that are enforced by our exploit
detection policy for detecting these attacks.
– Branch Addresses. The policy checks if any address is used as a target of any branch instruction
such as jmp or call. This defeats all those attacks which overwrite return addresses, function
pointers, global offset table (GOT) entries, etc. in order to redirect the program control flow to
the injected code or to some library function such as execve(). It also defeats frame faking
attacks that overwrite the stored frame pointer in order to create a fake stack frame when the
function returns.
– Format string arguments. The policy checks if any format function such fprintf() or syslog()
is called with a tainted format string argument. Any such case is identified as an exploitation
attempt irrespective of the format specifiers used. Therefore, it can not only defeat attempts
to overwrite arbitrary memory locations, but even arbitrary memory read attempts. Note that
such a check can not only detect an exploitation attempt, but can also pinpoint the vulnerability
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even before it is exploited. This is because the format string argument will still be tainted even
if the input is legitimate.
– System call arguments. The policy checks if any arguments used by a system call are overwritten
by tainted data. In Linux x86 architecture, a system call is implemented using software interrupt
0x80. The system call number is usually passed in the eax register. We instrument all int 0x80
instructions to check the value of eax register at run time. For execve system call, we check at
run time if its arguments are tainted. Such checks will not only defeat code injection attacks,
but even those attacks in which an attacker overwrites data that is later used as an argument
to a system call.
– Other control data. The policy also checks whether certain other control data such as boundary
tags in heap or longjmp buffer are tainted. Such tags are inserted at points where these control
data are used. For example, for boundary tags in heap, we insert checks in calls to free(), and
for longjmp buffers, we insert checks in calls to longjmp() and siglongjmp().
– Non-control data. The policy checks if any non-control data is marked as tainted in an illegit-
imate manner, such as by an overflow of an object. Such checks are implemented by checking
bounds of the object being written, as done by previous approaches such as LibSafe [18] or
LibSafePlus [19].
In the next section, we evaluate the effectiveness of our taint analysis approach against these
attacks. We validate our technique through extensive testing over synthetic and real-time exploits.
4 Evaluation
We have implemented a prototype of our approach on Linux x86 architecture. We use TIED to
dump variable size and location information into the program executable. Our prototype then uses
Pin to instrument the code by adding instructions to perform information flow tracking on these
objects and to detect attacks. The instrumentation is performed only once, at the program load
time. However, the instrumented code may run many times. Pin caches the generated instrumented
code, so that it need not be instrumented again when required.
We conducted a series of experiments to evaluate the effectiveness and performance of our
approach. All tests were run in single user mode on a Pentium-4 3.2 GHz machine with 512 MB
RAM running Linux kernel 2.6.18. All programs were compiled with gcc 4.1.2 and linked with glibc
2.3.6.
4.1 Effectiveness Evaluation
We tested the effectiveness of our approach using several synthetic and actual exploits. The exploits
were selected from a wide range of attacks including stack smashing attack, heap overflow, format
string attack, double free and non-control data attacks. Our approach successfully detected all the
exploitation attempts and terminated the victim program to prevent execution of malicious code.
The results are presented in Table 3.
Synthetic Exploits. In this section, we evaluate our approach using synthetic exploits on stack
overflows, heap overflows, and format string vulnerabilities. Our approach successfully detected all
the attacks without any false negatives.
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Table 3. Results of effectiveness evaluation
CVE# Program Attack Type Overwrite Target Description Detected
- Synthetic Stack Smashing Stored return address Stack Smashing At-
tack
X
- Synthetic Heap Overflow Boundary tags Heap Overflow At-
tack
X
- Synthetic Format String Attack GOT entry Format String At-
tack
X
- Synthetic Buffer Overflow Array in a structure Non-control data at-
tack
X
CVE-2003-0201 samba Buffer Overflow Stored return address Buffer overflow in
call trans2open()
function
X
CVE-2001-0010 bind Buffer Overflow Stored return address Buffer overflow in
nslookupComplain()
routine
X
CVE-2000-0763 xlock Format String Attack Stored return address Format string vulner-
ability when using -d
command line switch
X
CVE-2007-1711 PHP Double free attack Pointer to destructor Double free vul-
nerability using
session decode()
function
X
CVE-2007-4566 SIDVault Buffer Overflow Stored return address Buffer Overflow in
Simple Bind() func-
tion
X
CVE-2001-0820 ghttpd Buffer Overflow Stored ESI register Non-control data at-
tack
X
CVE-2000-0573 wuftpd Format String Attack Cached copy of user ID Non-control data at-
tack
X
– Stack Smashing Attack. To test the effectiveness of our approach against the classical stack
smashing attack, we wrote a program with a buffer overflow vulnerability. It uses strcpy() to
copy a command line argument to a local buffer. We tried inserting a long command line argu-
ment in order to overflow the buffer and to overwrite the stored return address. Our approach
successfully detected the tainted return address (which is treated like any other control data in
our approach) when the function returned.
– Heap Overflow Attack. In a similar test, we verified our approach by detecting a heap overflow.
We wrote a program with a heap overflow vulnerability. It allocates a buffer in heap, uses
strcpy() to copy the first command line input into the buffer, and then frees the buffer. We
injected a huge input in the first command line argument in order to overflow the buffer and
overwrite the boundary tags. Our approach successfully detected the tainted boundary tags
when the buffer was freed.
– Format String Attack. We used our approach on a custom written program with a format string
vulnerability. The program uses printf() to display the first command line argument. The
exploit for the program uses the format string attack to overwrite the global offset table (GOT)
entry for exit() function. The exploitation attempt was successfully detected as the format
string argument was found to be tainted. Note that for a format string attack, our approach
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can defeat all exploitation attempts of writing to and reading from arbitrary memory locations
irrespective of the format specifier used.
– Buffer Overflow Attack. To test our approach against non-control data attacks, we tried over-
flowing a buffer in a structure in order to overwrite a character array stored next to it. The
character array is used to hold the filename of the temporary file being written. The attack was
detected by the fine grained policy as the character array was found to be illegitimately written
by a tainted buffer.
Actual Exploits. We tested our approach on five exploits on publicly known vulnerabilities. All
the attacks were successfully detected by our approach.
– Samba call trans2open() Buffer Overflow. Samba version 2.2.8 and earlier suffer from a stack
smashing vulnerability [38] in call trans2open() function. Successful exploitation of the vul-
nerability allows a remote attacker to gain a root shell on the machine running vulnerable
version of samba. Our approach detected the tainted stored return address and defeated the
exploitation attempt.
– BIND 8 Buffer Overflow. BIND version 8.2 and earlier suffer from a buffer overflow [39] in the
nslookupComplain() routine, which allows a remote attacker to gain root access on the affected
machine. Our approach correctly detected that the return address is tainted and defeated the
attack.
– xlockmore Format String Vulnerability. xlock version 4.16 suffers from a format string vulnera-
bility [40] when using the command line argument -d, that can be used by a local user to gain
root privileges. The exploit overwrites the stored return address with the address of the injected
shellcode. Our approach successfully identified that the stored return address was tainted and
defeated the exploitation attempt.
– PHP Session Decode() Double Free Memory Corruption Vulnerability. PHP version 4.4.5 and
4.5.6 suffer from a double free vulnerability [41], that can be used by a local user to execute
arbitrary code in the context of the webserver or to cause denial of service conditions. The
exploit overwrites the pointer to a destructor with a junk value to cause denial of service. Our
approach successfully identified that the pointer to destructor was tainted and defeated the
exploitation attempt.
– ghttpd Log() Buffer Overflow Vulnerability. A stack overflow vulnerability [42] exists in ghttpd
version 1.4.3 and lower which allows a remote user to execute arbitrary code with the privileges
of the web server. The overflow occurs in Log() when the argument to a GET request overruns
a 200-byte stack buffer. In order to test our approach against non-control data attacks, we
modified the publicly available exploit to overwrite the stored ESI register on the stack, which
is a later copied to a pointer to the URL requested by the client. By overwriting the stored ESI
register, it is made to point to the URL /cgi-bin/../../../../bin/sh in order to execute a
shell. Our approach correctly detected the argument to the execlp() was tainted and defeated
the attack.
– wuftpd SITE EXEC Format String Vulnerability. wuftpd version 2.6.0 and earlier suffer from a
format string vulnerability [43] in SITE EXEC implementation that allows arbitrary code execu-
tion. We modified the publicly available exploit for this vulnerability to overwrite the cached
copy of user ID pw->pw uid with 0 so as to disable the server’s ability to drop privileges. The
attack was detected as the format string argument was found to be tainted.
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– SIDVault Simple Bind() Function Remote Buffer Overflow Vulnerability. SIDVault LDAP
server version 2.0e and earlier suffer from a buffer overflow [44], that can be used by a re-
mote user to gain root privileges. The exploit overwrites the stored return address with the
address of the injected shellcode. Our approach successfully identified that the stored return
address was tainted and defeated the exploitation attempt.
Note on SIDVault. We would like to mention here that our approach was tested on SIDVault
LDAP server buffer overflow attack [44], which is a proprietary software available without source
code. Whereas our approach is applicable to such proprietary software available without source
code, other approaches that rely on source code such as Xu et al’s approach [12] will not be able
to defend against attacks in such cases.
4.2 Performance Evaluation
To test the performance overhead of our approach, we used our approach on several CPU intensive
programs:
– bc - bc is an interactive algebraic language with arbitrary precision, with several extensions
including multi-character variable names, and full Boolean expressions. The test was to calculate
the factorial of 600.
– Enscript - Enscript converts ASCII files to PostScript, HTML, RTF or Pretty-Print and stores
generated output to a file or sends it directly to the printer. The test was to convert a 5.5 MB
text file to postscript.
– Bison - Bison is a general-purpose parser generator that converts a grammar description for an
LALR(1) context-free grammar into a program to parse that grammar. The test was to parse
a bison file for C++ grammer.
– gzip - Gzip is the standard file compression utility. The test was to compress a 12 MB file.
We performed all the tests 10000 times and took the averages of the results. We compare our results
to that of Xu et al’s approach, which has the lowest overhead among all the previous approaches.
Our approach incurred an average overhead of 37.2% while that of Xu et al’s approach [12] was
76%, which clearly shows an improvement by an order of magnitude. We present the test results
in Table 4 and in Table 5 we present a detailed feature comparison of our approach with previous
approaches.
Table 4. Comparison of overhead incurred by our approach with that of Xu et al’s approach
Program Test Overhead
Xu et al’s Our
approach [12] approach
bc-1.06 Find factorial of 600 61% 42.84%
enscript-1.6.4 Convert a 5.5 MB text file into a PS file 58% 28.63%
bison-1.35 Parse a Bison file for C++ grammer 78% 32.02%
gzip-1.3.3 Compress a 12 MB file 106% 45.38%
2 Requires debugging information
3 Can only detect non-control data attacks where a pointer is tainted
4 Performance results were not available
14
Table 5. Feature Comparison with previous approaches
Feature TaintCheck [6] TaintTrace [10] LIFT [9] Chen et
al’s ap-
proach
[4]
Xu et al’s
approach
[12]
Our ap-
proach
Works without additional hardware X X X ✕ X X
Works without source code X X X X ✕ X2
Detects non control data attacks ✕ ✕ ✕ X3 X X
Performance Overhead 3720% 553% 360% - 4 76% 37.22%
5 Discussion
In this section, in the context of our approach, we discuss ramifications of different security threats
and address concerns regarding protection of the shadow memory.
Ramifications of Varied Security Threats. In the present day scenario, attacks on web
applications, such as XSS and SQL injection, do contribute to the majority of the attacks today,
however, the impact of such attacks is limited than that of memory corruption attacks. For e.g., for
a server having both an XSS vulnerability and a buffer overflow vulnerability, exploitation of XSS
flaw may lead to credit card details of a user being stolen, while exploitation of buffer overflow may
lead to credit card details of all the users being stolen in a single attempt. Furthermore, exploitation
of XSS would give an attacker only a limited (user-level) access on the server while exploitation
of buffer overflow would give him superuser access (typically) on the server and it would even
give him access to the corporate intranet. It is important to note that, memory corruption attacks
have been used by worms such as CodeRed and Slammer, which plague the Internet in a matter
of few minutes. Defending from web application attacks is easier due to the availability of the
source code. However defending from memory corruption attacks is not easy due to source code
unavailability, performance considerations and other factors. Construction of exploits for memory
corruption attacks requires high expertise and experience. However, construction of exploits for
XSS and SQL injection is fairly easy. This is easily justified by the fact that a single zero-day
exploit for a Microsoft platform costs between 10000 - 100000 USD, in the underground market.
However, several freeware tools are available for exploiting XSS and SQL injection vulnerabilities.
Protection of Shadow Memory. For protecting the shadow memory we used an approach
similar to that used in [9]. Our shadow memory mapping strategy can prevent attackers from
directly modifying shadow memory as long as the attackers’ code is under the control of Pin. The
reason is that when attackers issue an instruction to access an address addr in the shadow memory,
the instrumented code will access memory at addr+shadow base, which is beyond the boundary of
the shadow memory area. This will cause an invalid memory access exception. Note that an attacker
might try to access the shadow memory by using a large value of addr so that addr+shadow base
overflows the 32-bits of the integer used to hold the sum. To counter such attacks, we check if the
sum addr+shadow base leads to an overflow condition.
Implicit Information Flows. Implicit information flow occurs when the values of certain
variables are related by virtue of program logic, even though there are no assignments between
them. For example, the following code snippet illustrates such a case.
if(x==0) y=0; if(x==1) y=1;
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The above code fragment is equivalent to the assignment y=x. Therefore, if x is tainted (untainted),
y is tainted (untainted) as well, although there is no direct assignment from x to y. But since the
value of y is assigned from a constant, it would be marked as untainted, irrespective of the tag of x.
Our approach supports some of such basic implicit information flows, such as the use of translation
tables, which are sometimes used for decoding using table lookups, such as y = table[x]. In such
a case, the array index x determines the value of y. To handle such cases, our approach marks the
result of an array access as tainted (untainted) whenever the index is tainted (untainted). Much
more complex implicit flows can be supported using a notion of noninterference, which however is
too conservative and leads to high false positives.
Limitations. Our approach is built on top of TIED. Although TIED does not require source
code of the programs, it requires them to be compiled with debugging information. A limitation
of our approach is that it does not work for stripped binaries, i.e. programs without debugging
and other symbol table information. However, we believe it is not such a major limitation as many
operating systems distributions, for example Microsoft Windows and Fedora family of operating
systems make debugging information available as separate packages [45,46]. Requirement for de-
bugging information may also ease reverse engineering in some cases. However, we argue that our
approach requires only information related to the variables. The debugging information related to
code can safely be removed from the program binaries. Even in the presence of debugging infor-
mation, obfuscations can still be applied to the code present in the binary to make it harder to
reverse engineer. Moreover, some approaches [47,48] have been proposed in the past that are able
to discover variables in stripped binaries with a high accuracy. We believe using a similar technique
would make our approach independent of the debugging information present in the executables,
making it work even for stripped binaries.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we presented a novel coarse-grained taint analysis approach to detect memory corrup-
tion attacks. Our approach propagates taint on data objects that are extracted from the debugging
information of the application. Attacks are detected when a tainted object is used in a security-
sensitive operation or when a tainted control-data is used. Our evaluation showed a substantial
improvement in performance over that reported by previous works on taint tracking. Also, our
approach detected a wide range of memory corruption attacks, including non-control data attacks.
One of the future works in our approach involves extracting variable information effectively
without the need for debugging information. Also, we are exploring ways of incorporating more
application context information so as to detect other attacks on critical variables that are identified
by the application developer.
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